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having complete knowledge ofthe tax system is a theoretical borderline. The specific
issuesexaminedinthisstudyare (i) "towhatextentdoconsumers(heremarriedwomen)
perceive their true marginal tax rate when they make their labour supply decisions?",
and (ii) "how does the perception of the marginal tax rate differ among various
socio-economic groups?". Using different approaches and different data sets·we con-
sistently find that (i) against conventional wisdom the assumption of complete
knowledge ofthe tax system does not fit the data well, and that (ii) education appears
to be the main determinant ofa correct perception ofthe marginal tax rate.
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Existing tax systems imply complex budget constraints, so that the assumption of
rationally acting individuals who have complete knowledge of the tax system has to
be regarded as a theoretical borderline. Yet it is difficult to model the extent of the
perception of tax costs, because questioning the rationality ofeconomic agents leads
the economist on unsteady ground. In this respect itis significative that Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980) address this perception problem only in connection with public goods
(pp. 322-323), whereas it really applies to most ofthe situations they consider.
The specific issues examined in this study are (i) "to what extent do consumers (here
married women) perceive their true marginal tax rate when they make their labour
supply decisions?", and (ii) "how does the perception ofthe marginal tax rate differ
among various socio-economic groups?". It is hardly necessary to dwell on the
importance ofthis problem forinvestigators attempting to quantify the impactoffiscal
policies on household behaviour. Forinstance, the idea to create economic incentives
by reducing marginal taxes will only make sense to the extent that the tax reduction is
perceived.
It is clearthat investigatingthe individuals' perception ofmarginal taxes questions the
paradigm ofthe rational utility-maximizing consumer. Empirical models ofconsumer
behaviourfollowing this paradigm incurthe risk ofmixing up normative and positive
theory, in the sense that they are more likely to describe how the consumer should
behave rather than how she does behave. Since the seminal work of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) we know that in certain well-defined situations consumers' choices
under uncertainty are inconsistent with the assumption of rational acting. In these
situations economic theory and econometrics will make systematic errors when pre-
dicting responses to tax ~hanges.
In microeconometric models of labour supply it is usually assumed either that indi-
viduals have perfect knowledge about the implications of the tax system as to their
marginal wage rates orthat individuals only know theirpre-tax wages (see forinstance
the survey of Hausman, 1985). From a purely theoretical point of view the latterapproach is ofcourse far less satisfactory. On the otherhand, it can happen that models
which adopt the perfect knowledge assumption do less well in terms of goodness of
fit and diagnostic checks (see below, Subsection 5.1, for evidence from French data).
However, it is possible to think of alternative specifications of labour supply which
nest the perfect knowledge case and the case ofcomplete ignorance as parametrically
extreme cases. This is the startingpoint for ouranalysis. Firstly, in using a logarithmic
specification for models the wage, the latter is conveniently additively decomposed
into a gross wage term and a marginal tax rate term which can be given different
coefficients (see Rosen 1976a and b, and the discussion in Nakamura and Nakamura,
1981). Introducing interactions between the marginal tax rate and household char-
acteristics is an easy way to allow for different behavioural patterns in this framework.
Ourempiricalanalysis willmainlyfocus onthisextensionofthe standard laboursupply
framework. In a second step we try to find further evidence ofsystematic departures
from the rational behaviour implied by the neoclassical labour supply model by
allowing for different preference structures and different stochastic assumptions.
Workers inmostwesterneconomieshave onlyincompleteknowledgeoftheirmarginal
wage when they make their labour supply decision. Unexpected changes in taxable
income due to new collective bargaining arrangements, illness, extra bonuses, job
change and overtime work produce tax uncertainty such that the exact knowledge on
the true marginal tax rate is only revealed a posteriori, in the year following the one
wheredecisions supposedlybasedonthatknowledgearetaken. Standardlaboursupply
models under uncertainty are able to deal with this kind of uncertainty in a general
manner by introducing the marginal wage rate as a stochastic price. However, by
applying the usual rational expectations framework, little can be learned about which
social groups have a better perception ofthe marginal tax rate.
Ourmotiveforinvestigatingdifferences inthe perceptionbyvarious socialgroups thus
lies in the following considerations. Some individuals may have no real incentive to
go to the trouble of gathering the information and knowledge necessary for the
computation oftheir marginal tax rate, namely those who pay little tax anyway, and
thosewhohavehighercosts forthananticipatedbenefitsfrom gatheringandprocessing
information. This will in particularbe the case for people who are relatively isolated.
2In view ofthese points one may expect the poor, the unemployed, the less educated as
well as the youngest and oldest cohorts (the latter may also fail to adjust to changes in
the tax system, even ifthey had a good approximation ofit at some point in their life
cycle) to care relatively less about their marginal tax rate than the rest.
Wahlund (1987) argues from a psychological point of view that the perception of a
reduction in marginal taxes depends on various factors such as the context or back-
ground, past experience as well as attention factors such as motives, expectations, and
payoff. For instance, individuals who have faced large fluctuations in income as well
as individuals experienced with the management of wealth, where taking taxes into
considerationis very important, are likelyto evaluatetheirtruetax ratemore accurately
than others do. Following prospect theoretical reasoning he argues that an increase in
the marginal tax rate shouldbe perceivedas biggerthan a corresponding decrease later
on, because the value function for losses is steeper than the value function for gains.
Some married women may even refuse to take their marginal wage rate into account,
as being discouraging and unfairly high. This is likely to happenfor relatively well-off
women in the case ofjoint taxation with the same marginal tax rate on both earners.
Individuals may also appear to disregard their marginal tax rate because they are
prepared to work in periods where the usual simple static labour supplymodels would
predict that it is not profitable for them to do so. Examples ofsuch situations could be
as follows: (i) better prospects later may make it attractive to work now, even if the
immediate reward seems comparatively small (forinstancetrainees: theirwage cannot
explain their current labour supply; women re-entering the labour market after a
non-participation spell for raising children: for psychological reasons, they may have
almost zero current reservation wage, yet this may increase rapidly when they regain
confidence); (ii)workmayenterutilitypositively(socialcontacts,prestige,self-esteem,
independence, etc.). Admittedly, the standard labour supply models are not able to
handle these aspects, but the direction ofthe effects mentioned could be that women
with olderchildren will be less inclined to take accountoftheirmarginal tax rates than
women with younger children or without children.
At any rate it seems interesting to try to see what data mayhave to say onthese points,
even ifthe interpretation of results pointing away from rationality calls for- extreme
3caution. In the application ofthe models that this paper suggests, we shall use panel
data for Germany and cross-section data for France. Using the latter, we have obtained
puzzling results from several different approaches (see Blundell et al., 1993, Gableret
aI., 1993,andLaisneyetaI., 1991).Wefound largeheterogeneityinthe groupofwomen
with higher education (completed secondary school or above). Although one expla-
nation could be found in the diverse motivations for human capital accumulation by
women, especially (a posteriori) in the case ofmarried women (mating, child quality
production, etc.), another possibility might be heterogeneity with respect to the per-
ception ofthe marginal wage rate.
At this stage it is perhaps worth stressing that we do not imply that households may
intendnot to comply with their intertemporalbudget restriction (see Hammond, 1989,
for the ensuing problems), although this may be ofminor importance in a life cycle
model oflabour supply with intertemporal separability.
The paper introduces three different approaches to the problem outlined above. All
three approaches nest the extreme assumptions ofperfect perception ofthe marginal
tax rate and ofcomplete disregard parametrically. The central approach we start with
rests on Rosen's (l976b) labour supply model with tax illusion which allows for
differingeffects (in absoluteterms)ofthe gross wage andthe tax rate on laboursupply.
Weextend Rosen's work and focus on the determinants oftax illusion by introducing
interaction effects ofthe log of one minus the tax rate with sociodemographic char-
acteristics. Empirical evidence on the validity of this specification is gained from
estimates on German panel data and French cross section.
Moreover, in order to obtain additional evidence we estimate two alternative models
whichassumeStone-Gearypreferences, anddifferentfunctional forms nesting the two
borderline cases. In a switching regressions probit model with unknown switching
point, the switching function determines the probability for each individual to act
according to one ofthe two extreme cases. Inthe last approach the individual's labour
forceparticipationdecisionis basedon"expected" wages andnon-wage labourincome
which are defined as a weighted average of the two extreme cases. The weights are
allowed to depend on observable socio-economic-characteristics, and this results in a
nonlinear probit model.
4The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we briefly present the model of
quasi-linearpreferences used for comparative treatment ofthe French and the German
data described in Section 3. Estimation results are presented in Section 4, along with
their implications for perceived retention rates. Section 5 concentrates on approaches
which are feasible when consumption is observable, which is only the case for the
French data. Subsection 5.1 presents the underlying preference specification and
comments on estimation and tests results for the two extreme cases separately. Sub-
section 5.2 discusses the two alternative statistical models. Estimation results are
presented in Subsection 5.3, and Section 6 gives concluding comments.
2 An Empirical Model
The motivation for our approach is based on the observation that structural empirical
labour supply models usually either use the gross wage or the marginal wage rate as
the price for leisure. Both approaches have in common that for a given information on
(marginal)wages andhours (and sometimesadditionallyonexpenditures),the position
of the budget constraint is assumed to be known by the individual and by the eco-
nometrician. Statistical inference on the preference structure is conditional on this
information set. In the sequel we relax the maintained hypothesis that the position of
thebudgetconstraintis knownand we defineas amisperceptionofthebudgetconstraint
a situation where, for a given combination ofhours supplied and marginal wage rate,
the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure does not coincide
with the real marginal wage rate.
Figure 1 will help understand what we have in mind when we combine a potential
misperception ofthe budget constraint with the choice ofa point that does not violate
that constraint. The situation ofa woman who takes her marginal tax rate into account
is described by the solid lines. These are the true and the linearized budget lines, as
well as the indifference curve which is tangent to the linearized budget line at the
observed (pC,h) point. The interrupted lines picture our representation of a misper-
ception ofthe budget restriction. This cuts the true budget line at the observed (pC , h)
point but has the wrong slope there. Ofcourse this is quite involved since it is difficult
to seewhatmechanismsensureaposteriorithe consistencyofthe 'mistaken' behaviour
5with the true budget restriction. But, loosely speaking, such mechanisms may be at
work in the timing of the savings decisions and of the tax payment itself. What is
important here is that if we wrongly assume that an individual behaves according to
the solid rather than the interrupted lines in Figure 1 (or vice versa), we will obtain
biased estimates of her preference parameters. We shall assume that, given a set of
observable characteristics, agents have the same preferences up to a stochastic com-
ponent which does not depend on whether their perception ofthe budget constraint is
correct or not, but that they can differ in the latter respect, according to another set of























Figure 1: Perception and misperception ofthe marginal tax rate
6In terms of our definition of perception of marginal taxes the following empirical
approaches have three common features: (i) They give up the maintained hypothesis
that the true position of the budget constraint is known, (ii) the perceived budget
constrained is endogenous and depends on individual characteristics and (iii) the
approaches nest the two extreme cases of perfect knowledge case and the complete
ignorance. The differences lie in the assumptions about the underlying preference
structure, in the stochastics and in the computational burden.
An appealing and simple way to extend the neoclassical labour supply framework in
the direction sketched above is to introduce interaction terms with the marginal tax
rate. Given the situation in the German data, where consumption is not observed, an
interesting starting point which is described in more detail by Laisney etal. (1993) is
a life cycle labour supply model based on additive intertemporal preferences where
contemporaneous preferences are quasi-linear (indifference curves are parallel). This
implies that there is no income effect on leisure. Moreover, regardless ofthe normal-
ization chosen for within-period preferences, hours supplied will be independent of
assets in period 0, interest rates and the rate of time preference. This is of course an
extremely restrictive set of assumptions, but given the complexity of the estimation
strategy pursued here, it will provide a convenient benchmark. In that case Frisch
demands for leisure correspond exactly with Hicksian and with Marshallian demands
and depend only on the real wage. Yet, since static models of female labour supply
typically yield small income elasticities, this may not be such a bad model. In detail,
the period t utility function is specified as
U,CC"L,) =F,[C, +V,CL,)] =:F,[U;CC"L,)],
for some increasing functions Frand Vr, where C,: denotes household aggregate con-
sumption in period t, and L, denotes the desired leisure ofthe female in period t. We
specify the parsimonious parametric form Box-Cox functional form VtCLt ) =YtLt{P},
withL{P}:= (LP- 1)1~ if~ ~ 0, lnL otherwise.Utilityincreasinginleisurerequires 'Y, > 0.
This is easily achieved inestimation by specifying a logarithmic equationforthis taste
shifter. Convexity ofindifference curves requires ~ < 1. Using the following specifi-
cation for the taste shifter and the gross wage
7and the condition that a woman chooses hours equating her MRS and her perceived
net wage, this results in the following form for an interior solution in desired leisure:
z~+£1 =-(~-1)In([-N)+ InW +aIn{1 - -r(Y, WN)}. (2.1)
HereL denotes the amount oftime available for allocation between market time and
'leisure',N are the desired hours ofwork ofthe individual, Y is herhusband's income,
exogenous, and W is hergross wage rate, assumed exogenous. -r denotes the marginal
tax rate, which is in Germany a function ofthe individual's earnings and ofthe other
income of the household, here her husand's income. a denotes an essential house-
hold-specific multiplierfor this study: its presence corresponds to taking account ofa
"subjective" marginal retention rate p. defined by p. = (l--r)u. In the following the
perception rate a depends on a vector ofsocio-economic characteristics, V, that may
proxy the individual's knowledge about the tax system. Assuming linearity we have
a =Vr, wherer is aparametervectorto be estimated. Fora =1condition (2.1) reflects
the supply conditionunder perfectknowledge about marginal wage rates. Given a =0
we are in the framework where marginal tax rates are completely ignored. However,
in this approach we do not restrict a to lie between 0 and 1. Thus a negative a would
leadtoaretentionrateaboveoneanda > 1wouldindicatean 'exaggeration'ofmarginal
tax rates.
Our econometric treatment of observations with missing wage information, or with
irregular employment or unemployment takes care of some of the problems that
availability ofdetailed information on demand conditions might help to handle more
explicitly. Actual hours, butalso the desiredhours available inourdata, are influenced
by the availability ofthe corresponding (hours, wage) offers. It is also apparent from
a histogram of these desired hours (reproduced in Laisney et al. 1993), that most
respondentsgiveanswersthataremultiplesof5. Weshallcopewiththisbyconsidering
ranges ofdesired hours as the observed dependent variable rather than the actual level
8ofdesired hours. This technique is used by Blundell et al. (1993) but we are in a better
position to use it here, because we do not have to make their assumption that actual
and desired hours fall into the same interval.
3 Data
3.1 German data: sample selection and description ofvariables
We use the unbalanced sample from Laisneyetal. (1993). The selection is summarized
in Table 3.1. In order to avoid the non-convexity ofthe budget set caused by means-
tested benefits, we restricted the sample used in the estimation to females who would
not be entitled to the means-tested benefits giving rise to a marginal tax rate of 100%
at zero hours. This selection rule only depends on the "unearned income" and on the
demographicsofthe household,andis exogenousintheframeworkofourassumptions.
Table 3.1: Sample Selection
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
all females with valid interview 5631 5378 5308 5068 4930
German nationality 4287 4090 4010 3774 3586
age 25 - 57 2434 2328 2262 2129 2038
married and living together with partner 1903 1781 1736 1633 1555
no partner change, marriage, divorce, etc..
1846 1726 1669 1582 1510
head or wife ofhead ofhousehold 1842 1717 1656 1575 1499
no other adults in household 1842 1717 1656 1574 1499
not self-employed 1734 1621 1548 1477 1411
after deleting missing values..
1530 1419 1361 1266 1192
no benefits at zero hour~ 1328 1237 1193 1139 1068
* in last 18 months
** except hours and female income information
We refer the reader to Laisney et al. (1993) for the description ofthe variables used in
the determination ofthe form ofthe budgetsetofeachhousehold, since this represents
a large portion ofthat paper.
9Gross wages for the participants have been computed as reported gross monthly
earnings of the last month divided by reponed average working hours (per week) of
the last month multiplied by 4.3. The resulting number is multiplied by 13/12 in order
to accountfortheadditional incomecomponentcorrespondingtothe"thirteenthmonth"
practice. In our final sample we consider observations in the lower and the upper
percentile of the wage distribution as indicating unplausible values for either the
working hours orthe gross monthly income. Moreover, we discard the information on
wages for several particulargroups ofobservations and treat them like the jobseekers,
for whom the only information we use is the fact that their desired hours are positive.
The variables used in estimation may be summarily described as follows (see Table
3.2for some descriptive statistics). Wages: real gross wage=gross wage / price index.
Hours: desired,forparticipants: nonnalweeklyhours overtheyear; observed,including
overtime, for the computation of gross wages. These are average weekly hours over
the year.
Non-participants: women who report being registered as unemployed, orbeing out of
the labour force and, in case they answered yes to the question "future participation
(yes, perhaps, no)", declared that they do not look for a job that would begin
immediately. Seekers: women who report being registered as unemployed, or being
out ofthe labour force and, in case they answered yes to the question "future partici-
pation (yes, perhaps, no)" declared that they do look for a job that would begin
immediately. Participants: women who report working full- or part-time, or being in
vocational training, or working irregularly, or who report positive desired hours or
positiveobservedhours. Participantswith missingwageinformation: Participantswith
missing information on earnings oron observedhours oron desired hours, orworking
irregularly, orreporting to work full time but with average weekly hours below 20, or
reporting to workparttimebutwithaverage weekly hours above 35, orwithcomputed
gross nominal wage in the upper or lower 5% ofthe distribution. We thus have four
categories ofobservations: non-participants, seekers, participants with missing infor-
mation, and participants with complete information.
Age: Woman's age in years (year ofwave - year ofbirth), divided by 10. The square
ofthesamevariableis usedalso. Schooling: Threedummiesforhighestgradeingeneral
10Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics: Germany
Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Variable mean std mean std mean std mean std mean std
price index 1 0 0.998 0 0.999 0 1.01 0 1.039 0
non-participants 0.49 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.47
seekers 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04
participants 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.50
part., no wage information 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13
real hourly wage (OM 1985)* 14.9 5.41 16.0 7.67 16.1 6.3 17.0 7.05 17.0 7.00
desired weekly hours* 25.4 9.64 26.1 8.73 26.9 9.10 25.5 8.85 26.5 8.91
actual weekly hours* 30.4 11.2 32.0 11.2 30.2 11.3 29.4 11.7 29.9 10.8
age 41.1 9.01 41.5 8.99 41.5 8.90 41.5 8.91 41.4 8.94
disability 0.03 0.15 0.04 0.14 0.04 0.16 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.15
potential experience 25.8 9.32 26.5 9.15 26.7 8.78 27.1 9.00 27.3 8.06
schooling: highest degree
Hauptschlfle, or no degree 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.72
Realschule 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Fachoberschule, Abitur 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
children:
youngestichild 0-2 years 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.07
II II 3-5 " 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.14
" 6-11 " 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.18
" 12-15 " 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.09
" 16-25 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.28 0.30
number ofchildren 0-5 0.27 0.55 0.29 0.59 0.27 0.55 0.27 0.55 0.24 0.51
" 6-11 0.30 0.56 0.31 0.58 0.33 0.62 0.35 0.63 0.36 0.64
" 12-15 0.26 0.50 0.23 0.48 0.21 0.46 0.20 0.45 0.19 0.43
" 16-25 0.58 0.84 0.57 0.82 0.58 0.82 0.58 0.83 0.60 0.81
regional variables
northern states 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.29
Berlin 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02
central states 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.17
Bayern, Baden-Wiirttemberg 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.33
Urbanisation (areas)
more than 500' inhabit. 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.43
100' - 500' 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
20' - 100' 0'.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
less than 20' 0.30 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29
Parameters oftax approx
marginal tax rate at zero hours 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.07
margo tax rate at desired hours 0.29 0.19 0.29 0.18 0.30 0.18 0.29 0.17 0.30 0.17
benefits at zero hours: dummy 0.13 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.10
* participants with "accepted" wage rates only
11education, corresponding to (years of schooling in brackets) "Hauptschule" (9)
"Mittlere Reife" (10) "Abitur" or "Zulassung zur Fachhochschule" (13 and 12,
respectively). Potential experience: (Age - Years ofschooling - 6) / 10. The square is
also used. Children: (i) Numbers ofchildren: up to 5 years ofage, between 6 and 11,
between 12 and 15, older than 15 and still in education. (ii) Dummies youngest child:
up to 2 years ofage, between 3 and 5, between6 and 11, between 12 and 15, older than
15 and still in education. Urbanization grade (Boustedt): Town, village, rural (below
20' inhabitants).
3.2 French data: sample selection and description ofvariables
We work with the subsample of 3658 households from the INSEE survey "Budgets
des Familles 1979" already used by Laisney et al. (1991) and Blundell et al. (1993).
Theselectionwas madeaccordingto thefollowing criteria: weconsidersingle tax units
basedona married couplewherethe male is eitherworking or, ifpresentlyout ofwork,
is seeking ajob.Thehousehold has no otherwage earnerthan the husband orthe wife.
The latteris neitherat school nor is a student ora pensioneroran 'aide familiale', she
is neitherself-employednora teacheroranartistoramemberofclergy,armyorpolice.
She is between 26 and 65 years'ofage and reports at most 69 normal weekly hours of
work. Since means-tested benefits are assessed on the taxable income ofthe previous
year, we onlytake taxes in a strict sense properinto account in this first approach. We
nowsummarilydescribethevariablesused(ageandpotentialexperiencehavethe same
definition as for the German data). Wages: gross wages for the participants have been
computed as reported gross yearly earnings (including bonuses) divided by reported
normal weekly workinghours times52. Hours: reportednormal weeklyhours ofwork.
Seekers: unemployed and women who do not participate at the time ofthe interview
butwho reportthatthey are currently lookingforajob.Participants: only womenwho
report positive hours. Non-participants: women who do not belong to either of the
previous categories. Wethus have onlythree categories ofobservations forthe French
data.
12zew
Schooling: three dummies forhighest grade in general education, correspondingto end
of primary school (BE), mid secondary school (BEPC), end of secondary school or
above (baccalaureat). Numbers ofchildren: (i) not yet in the next category, (ii) at the
"ecolematemelle" (kindergarden),(iii) dummiesforthenumbers ofchildrenatprimary
and secondary school (1, 2, 3ormore). Marginal tax rate: the approach here is simpler
than for the German data and makes the assumption ofconstancy ofthe marginal tax
rate over the relevant range of hours. For the French data this is an acceptable
approxim~tion (see Blundell et al. 1993 for details).




gross nominal hourly wage(FF)* 17.7
normal weekly hours (actual)* 36.6
age 39.6
potential experience 23.1




end primary school (BE) 0.43
mid secondary school (BEPC) 0.18




dummy one other chilq 0.26
dummy two other children 0.23
three or more other children 0.14
suburb 0.39






























Due to a substantial clustering ofhours in both samples we restrict our attention to a
model specification where hours information is grouped according to the cut-points
22.5, 27.5, 32.5, 37.5 hours per week. The choice of these cut-points is justified in
Laisney et al. (1993). For the German panel data we estimate the model for all five
cross-sections by maximum likelihood and use the' minimum distance estimation
technique to enforcethe panel structure on the cross-section estimates. InTable 4.1 we
present two sets ofestimates for Germany, according to whether or not we restrict the
variance of the taste shifter to 1. Table 4.2 presents the corresponding maximum
likelihood results for the French cross-section. Both sets of results are based on the
choice ofL=10.5 hours a day.!
A first feature ofthe results is that estimates ofthe wage elasticity ofleisure are fairly
highin absolute terms compared to the results ofprevious studies using the same data
(Laisneyetal., 1993,andHujerandSchnabel, 1992,forGermany; Dagsviketal., 1988,
and Blundell et al., 1993, for France).
In many respects the estimates for Germany seem more reliable than the results for
France and we discuss these first. The parameters ofthe wage equation and the taste
shifterare fairly standard. The (log-) wage profile is bell-shaped in terms ofpotential
experience, with amaximum at22 years ofexperience. Ininterpreting the coefficients
in the taste shifter it must be remembered that a positive impact on the taste shifter
increases the weight of leisure in the utility function. Having children in any of the
defined age groups implies a reduction ofhours supplied.
Most interesting for the present study are the results obtained for the coefficients
appearing in the perception rate. In terms of our model, positive coefficients on the
different child dummies in V indicate that women with children are likely to have a
higherperceptionofthemarginaltaxrate. Weofferthefollowingtentativeexplanations
for this finding. Iffamilies with children find it more difficult than childless couples
I Inopposition with mostofthe literature on this point, wefind that this choice does matter. Ideally,
one would want to allowr to vary with demographics, but this would strain identification one step
further than we already do. For the German data, the value of 10.5 corresponds approximately to an
estimate obtained by restraining (l to be equal to 1.
14to make ends meet, they may be more inclined to take into account their true marginal
tax rate. Moreover, having access to special tax allowances for families with children
may produce a betterknowledge about the true tax rate. However, this argument is not
supported by our finding that owning a house, and thus possibly receiving corre-
sponding tax reductions, has no significant impact on the perception rate. The neo-
classicalassumptionthatindividualsareperfectlyawareoftheimplicationsofmarginal
tax rates appears more likely to hold for women with a highereducational degree than
for the reference group.
The estimates for France differ to some extent from previous results. This holds for
the wage equation, where we do not find a significant impact ofpotential experience
on wages; furthermore, the coefficients on the child dummies appearing in V are not
well determined and are negative in contrast to the results obtained with the German
data. Education has the expected positive sign. The impact of age on the perception
rate is concave withamaximumatage48, whereaswefindno sucheffectforGermany.
Thedummy variableforthe ownershipofatelephone was includedto pickuppotential
differences in information. Its positive impacton wages and the perception rate might
alsopickup anincomeeffect. AlthoughtheresultsforFranceappearrobustwithrespect
to inclusion ofthis variable, they are very fragile as far as other modifications ofthe
specification are concerned: since the specification reported here is derived from the
final specification retained for the German data, we have good reasons to suspect it to
fit the French data less well. Experimenting with changes in the level ofr, we found
thatr =15 led to a lowerelasticity but to evenmore negative values ofa than implied
by the estimates reported here. When changing the grouping ofhours we encountered
difficulties with convergence.
2 Due to this instability and to the better quality ofthe
German data as regards the evaluation of marginal tax rates, we concentrate on the
implications ofthe estin,tated model for Germany. We will come back to the French
data when discussing models which take advantage ofthe availability ofinformation
on expenditures.
2 Wealsohadconvergenceproblemswhentryingtoproduceresultswitha constantacrossindividuals
while retaining the same specification for the preferences, as done by Rosen (1976b): the resulting
model was obviously underparameterized, which again points to the identification issue discussed
above.
15Table 4.1: Gennany: Minimum Distance Estimation, Unbalanced Panel,
Results with and without Restriction on Variance ofTaste Shifter (*: std. err)
Restriction (Yes/No) No Yes
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0.016Table 4.2: France: Maximum Likelihood Estimation, Cross-section,
Results with and without Restriction on Variance ofTaste Shifter (*: std. err.)
Restriction (Yes/No) No Yes
coef. t-value coef. t-value
~ 0.723 9.4 0.747 49.3
Wage equation constant 2.722 34.8 2.723 35.4
potential experience /10 0.052 0.9 0.053 0.9
pot. expo squared /100 -0.007 -0.6 -0.008 -0.6
suburb 0.093 5.0 0.091 5.2
regional unemployment -3.343 -4.8 -3.340 -4.9
telephone 0.172 8.3 0.173 8.6
BEPC 0.211 7.0 0.205 9.2
baccalam-eat orabove 0.413 12.1 0.411 12.2
Taste shifter constant 11.532 4.0 10.727 8.3
age /10 -3.095 -2.7 -2.809 -4.4
age squared /H)O 0.378 2.8 0.343 4.6
numbers ofchildren:
small 0.507 2.7 0.464 3.6
ecole matemelle 0.393 3.0 0.359 5.0
dummy 1 otherchild 0.382 2.9 0.348 4.7
dummy 2 otherchildren 0.802 3.4 0.732 8.2
3 ormore other children 1.082 3.5 0.988 9.7
BEPC orbelow -0.607 -2.8 -0.551 -4.3
baccalaureat orabove -1.221 -2.4 -1.076 -4.6
Variables in V constant 30.080 -3.1 -27.414 -6.1
age /10 11.414 2.9 10.389 4.8
age squared /100 -1.189 -2.8 -1.083 -4.4
youngest child small -0.147 -0.2 -0.135 -0.2
" "ec. mat. -0.498 -1.1 -0.447 -1.1
" other -0.634 -1.8 -0.575 -2.1
BEPC orbelow 1.665 2.4 1.522 3.1
baccalaureat orabove 5.129 3.1 4.660 6.5
telephone 1.336 5.3 1.284 6.9
Covariance (JI 1.076 0.236* 1
structure p 0.516 0.093 0.541 0.059*
(J2 0.406 0.013 0.406 0.013
17Based on the estimates withno restriction, the perception rate was computedfor every
year and individual for the German data. Table 4.3 gives descriptive statistics on the
predicted individual perception rates. The mean of0.23 is far from Rosen's (1976b)
estimate for a constant a close to unity. For 70% ofthe individuals in the sample the
predicted a lies between 0 and 1 with a median value of0.15.
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics ofpooled estimated
perception rates and t-statistics for Gennany, 1985-1989
Quantiles 1% 25% 50% 75% 99% Mean
aj=vVj -0.20 -0.04 0.15 0.44 1.11 0.23
HO:ai = 0 (disregard) -1.67 -0.34 1.10 2.97 5.51 1.38
Ho:a j = 1 (rationality) -10.16 -7.37 -5.87 -3.78 0.50 -5.60
The table also presents t-statistics which allow various one-sided and two-sided tests.
Thusa is significantlynegativeforonlyabout 1%ofthe sample. Intenns ofourmodel
these are people who overstate redistribution in their favour. Formore than half the
sample we cannot reject the assumption oftotal disregard ofthe marginal tax rate at
the 5% level (a=0 againts a "# 0), whereas it is only for a little more than 10 per cent
oftheindividualsthatwe areunableto rejectthe hypothesis ofperfectrationality(a=1
againsta "# 1). Forno individual is a significantly above 1. This means that, contrary
to whatWahlund (1987) reports forSweden, we do notfindinourGennansample any
marked tendency to exaggerate the marginal tax rate.
The plots of the perception rate a against the marginal tax rate according to labour
market status, given in Figures 2a and 2b indicate on the whole an increasing rela-
tionship (the irregularities around marginal tax rates of0.3 to 0.4 or in excess of0.65
are caused by very few individuals, as documented in Figure 3b).3 Individuals with a
marginal tax rate around 0.35 and individuals withextremely high marginal tax rates
are most likely to take their tax rates into account whenthey make their labour supply
decisions. However, evenfor these two small groups a is farfrom being unity.
3 Theplots show kernel regressions ofa on 't with confidence bands constructed with±
twice the standard deviation (ofthe conditional mean).
18Comparing across groups, wefind thatthe perceptionofpart-timeworkers seemsmore
accurate than that offull-time workers, which is consistent with the highereducation,
on average, ofpart-time workers, and that seekers have a flatter profile than non par-
ticipants.
Forindividuals with zero marginal tax rate, whatevertheirlabourmarketposition, the
question ofmisperception ofthe marginal tax rate is without any importance for the
labour supply decision since at a tax rate ofzero the impact ofthe misperception on
hours supplied is nil, at least in our model.
Therefore it is interesting to look at the relationship between the actual marginal tax
rate t and the perceived marginal tax rate t·, where the latteris defined by the relation
(l-t)U=I -t·, and represents the tax rate that would produce the same behaviour if
exactly perceived. This relationship is depicted in Figures 3a and 3b, where on top of
the kernel plots we have also represented each individual point (t,t·). The clustering
ofvalues oft around some ofthe lowervalues correspond to tax allowances and to an
allowanceforthe paymentofsocialcontributions (seeLaisneyetaI., 1993,fordetails).
The solid straight line shows equality between t and t·, orperfect perception.
One way to look at the pictures is to ask what the perceived marginal tax rate is on
averageforagivenmarginaltaxrateof,say0.45.Thatvalueis 0.18fornonparticipants,
0.14forseekers,0.08forpart-timers and0.06forfull-timers. Itis small,butthe relative
magnitudes are in intuitive accordance with the observed labour market status. How-
ever, it is worth noting also that a possible explanationforthis ranking couldlie inthe
fact that our model takes no account of the "investment in human capital" aspect of
market work.
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Figure 3b: Perceived margo tax. rate: part-time workers (top) and full-time workers (bot.)
235 Alternative Approaches
5.1 Theoretical Model and Previous Results
We start with no taxes and with the standard problem ofone individual with inter-
temporally separable preferences who maximizes expected discounted utility




inself-explainingnotation,andwithuncertaintylimitedto the(gross) wage and interest
rate profiles. Using the Bellmanprinciple, we define
T
V t +1=maxE L ~kU(ck,hk) s.t.(2)fork=t+l, ...,T. (5.3)
t+lk=/+1




Thus, conditioning onA, , the current period decision variables c, and h, are solutions
of
and the fonn of the constraint in (5.6) stresses the relevance of "dissaving" IJ.t as
conditioningvariable.Thiswillallowus toomitthetimeperiodsubscripttinthe sequel.
In a model withtaxes, the constraints (5.2) are replaced by
24Ak= (1 +rk)Ak: 1+Yk +wkhk- PkCk -/(hk,Yk' rk,Ak_I,Ak) (5.7)
with1(.) a general tax function. An approximation (exactly valid over some range of
hours for a piecewise linear budget restriction) is obtained by linearizing the budget
constraint, using the "net" counterparts of Yt , rt, and WI:
(5.8)
Hence the definition ofthe "net" dissaving variable
(5.9)
Thusforgiven(pc, h) andw (or W*), Jl (orJl*) is obtainedfrom therelevant(linearized)
budget constraint.
4
Finally, going over to the households we shall be interested in subsequently, namely
householdsbasedona married couple,the analysis goes throughunderthe assumption
that male leisure is both separable from female leisure and consumption and con-
strained. The only change necessary is a redefinition ofthe unearned income variable
Y so as to include the male's earnings.
Thepreference specificationweuse here is describedindetailinBlundelletal. (1993).
Here it will suffice to say that it leads to the following labour supply equation:
h =(l - ~)y+ ~(d - Jl)/w , (5.10)
with a nonnal stochastic component appearing additively in y. This interpretation of
the stochastic component in tenns of random preferences only will simplify the
expositionwithoutintroducingsignificantrestrictions. Sincethelaboursupplyfunction
(5.10) includes the "net" dissaving variableJl we are only able to estimate the model
for the French data which include infonnation on expenditures.
4 A more detailed analysis ofthe caseofa nonlinear tax function and ajustificationofthe procedure
followed here are given by Blomquist (1985).
25Since the study ofBlundell et al. gives some grounds to distrust the hours information
available in the data used, we shall concentrate on the participation rather than on the
full laboursupply decision. Indoing so we lose information whichmayhelpidentifying
the preference parameters, but on the other hand we discard one potential source of
misspecificat'on. Other potential sources of misspecification are errors in variables,
simultaneitybias, and fixed costs ofparticipation. Errors in variables and endogeneity
inbothwages anddissaving are, to someextent,taken careofby the use ofinstrumental
variables. Fixed costs of work may be more problematic since these are included in
the consumption ofparticipants but are unobserved for non-participants.
Table 5.1 shows probit estimates for the participation condition derived from (5.10).
The first pair of columns relates to the assumption that every woman in the sample
considers the completetax system,includingbenefits and social securitycontributions,
while the second sets the marginal tax rateto zero and corresponds to a linear budget
constraint. Assuming that everyone disregards her marginal tax rate leads to much
stronger wage effects. Another striking difference is the reversal on the impact of
education on participation, and the very different estimates for the minimum
expenditures, which are identified from a probit model (three last lines of the table).
See Blundell et al. for more details.
Thediagnostics reportedinTable5.2 show a trade-offbetweenthe specification ofthe
marginal tax rate and non-linearity in the preferences: linearity is passed easily for the
model with complete treatment ofthe tax system only. The deterioration ofthe hete-
roscedasticity diagnostic for the inverse ofthe marginal wage reinforces this finding,
which is no surprise since that diagnostic picks up a special type ofnon-linearity.
26Table 5.1 Probit estimates with identical perception ofthe tax system
for all households.
Model marginal wage rate gross wage rate
Variable coeff. t-val. coeff. t-val.
intercept 0.8246 3.3162 2.7082 10.8132
(age-40)/10 -0.3812 -11.5598 -0.3601 -10.5605
same, squared -0.1310 -4.3122 -0.1237 -4.0230
primary school 0.2909 5.1043 0.1941 3.2905
lower secondary 0.4548 5.3075 -0.0412 -0.4470
end secondary 0.3623 3.0921 -0.3322 -2.6525
higher education 0.2863 2.0110 -0.3482 -2.3681
small children -0.6878 -10.4453 -0.5634 -8.2270
ecole matemelle -0.4793 -9.3007 -0.3599 -6.6668
one other child -0.2481 -3.9844 -0.1018 -1.6071
two other children -0.6666 -9.0512 -0.3657 -4.7561
> 2 other children -0.9137 -10.1181 -0.3510 -3.5295
suburb dummy 0.1610 3.3477 0.0008 0.0172
1/marg. wage [l/w] 2.3854 0.9246 -16.7075 -5.3414
owner/w -0.9884 -1.0722 0.2224 0.1826
buyer/w 2.1465 3.4361 2.8566 3.4540
rn/w -1.5684 -8.4054 -4.0566 -14.0549
-2*Log Lik. 4397 4182




















































3.9365.2 Two Alternative Statistical Models
5.2.1 Switching Regressions
In this approach we consider that each individual has some probability 7t to take her
true marginaltax rate into account andprobability 1-7tto disregarditfully. Given that
(5.9) is written with different versions ofw and ~ in eachcase, but withthe same error
tenn, the model will have the following structure:
(5.11)
z·=.Zc-v,
where u and v are jointly nonnal with variances set equal to 1 and correlation p . The
nonnalisation of the variances corresponds to the usual lack of identification in
dichotomous models. The latent variable y. coincides with y; in regime 1, that is, if
z· ~0, and with y; otherwise. The observed dichotomous variable y is defined as
y =1[y. ~0] .Thus the participation probability is given by
p=P[y=l]=P[y;~O 1\ z·~O] + P[y;~O 1\ z·<O] (5.12)
=P [u 5: XIb 1\ V 5: Zc] + P [u 5: X2b 1\ v >ZC ]
where <1>(2) denotes the cumulative ofthe bivariate nonnal. Ifp=0 this simplifies to:








dlnL Yi - Pi
dPi =Pi(1 - p;)
dP , ,
db =<!>(X1b)<t>(Ze - pX1b)X1+ <!>(X2b)[1-<t>(Ze - pX2b)]X2
dp .
de =<!>(Ze) [<t>(X1b - pZe) -<t>(X2b - pZe)]Z
(5.15)
(5.16)
the latter relationship being given in Hausman andWise (1978, fn.17). There does not
appear to be any theoretical identification problem in either case, except in some
pathological cases. For instance, ifXl =X2, Yis not identified. It is however clearthat
the model puts great strain on the data (see Kiefer, 1979). The Appendix reports on
limitedexperimentationwithsimulateddatausingthismodel.This yieldsthefollowing
conclusions, which would need to be checked with a thorough Monte-Carlo study. 1
Convergence is obtained easily using numerical gradients but is often difficult with
analytical gradients. The explanation seems to lie in insufficient precision in the
computation of the univariate and bivariate cumulative probability functions for the
normal. 2 Wrongly assuming that p=0 causes little bias in the estimation ofb as long
as p is not too large. 3 The numberofobservations necessary for preciseestimation of
the parameters e of the switching process is much larger than that giving precise
estimationfor the preference parameters b. Preciseestimationofp requires evenmore
observations.
5.2.2 Convex Combination Approach: Nonlinear Probit
The basic idea of the following convex combination approach is to treat wages and
nonwage income perceived by the individual as a convex combination of the two
extreme cases: The rational perception of the budget constraint's curvature and the
complete disregard ofmarginal wage rates. Assuming that the individual's perception
ofthe budget constraint is given by:
29(5.17)
where the superscript p denotes the individual's perception of the corresponding
variable. This perception is expressed as weighted average ofthe two extreme cases.
Forthe perceived wage rate this is given as the weightedaverage ofthe marginal wage,
w·, and the gross wage, W . More precisely, if \jI denotes the relative weight given to
"rational" tax behaviour, w P is defined as:
(5.18)
The perceivednonlabourincome is defined correspondingly. Hencefor \jI=I equation
(5.18) reduces to the linearized budget constraint of the conventional neoclassical
laboursupply mod~l with taxes, and results in the linear budget constraint ofan indi-
vidual ignoring taxes for \jI=0. Ina second step the perception weight is endogenized
by expressing \jI as a function of observable socio-economic characteristics. For our
econometric approach we assume a logistic functional fo~ for \jI in order to restrict
the weights to the interval [0,1] while keeping the computational burden low:
\jI=(1 +exp(-z'y)r\ (5.19)
wherez is ak x 1- vectorofexplanatoryvariables andyisthe correspondingparameter
vector to be estimated. Forthe quasi-homothetic preferences corresponding to (5.10)
the labour supply specification will be:
(5.20)
Since we use only binary information on hours, the convex combination approach
results in a probit model which is both parameters and variables. Incomparison to the
switching probit model this model is stochastically simpler, but this does not reduce
the computational burden, because of the high degree of non-linearity implied by
equations (5.18-5.20).
The convex combination approach is not only justified as an approach that nests the
two extreme cases while being parametrically considerably richer, it also has some
theoreticaljustificationsinceitcanbederivedfrom utilitymaximizingbehaviourunder
30uncertainty with respect to the income taxes. This, however, requires the strong
assumption that expected wages are based on a binary outcome as given by (5.18).
Since it is more likely that individuals have "some partial knowledge about their tax
rateswe wouldpreferto referto w Pas perceivedmarginal wagerateratherthanexpected
marginal wage rate.
5.3 Estimation Results
5.3.1 Switching Regressions Model
In our first attempts at estimating the switching regressions model we did not impose
equality of all the preference parameters between regimes and assumed a constant
probability of disregard across households. This led to almost exactly the results
obtained for the gross wage rate in Table 5.1, and a probability of disregard almost
equal to 1. In a second type of attempts, we moved to the other extreme in order to
obtainsomedeviationfrom completedisregard: we retainedonlyaconstant,theinverse
of the wage and the ratio IJIw in each regime, without restrictions, while all other
variables appeared in the switching process. The results are not reproduced because
the correspondinghessianis notinvertible:ithasthreenulleigenvalues associated with
the preference parameters forthe "tax" regime. Besides,the probabilityofparticipation
forthe tax regime amounts to zeroforalmostevery observation. Finally, we did impose
the restriction of identical preference parameters across regimes: a surprising conse-
quenceis thatthe hessiannowhas 8null eigenvalues,all ofthembeingrelatedto switch
parameters.
5.3.2 Estimation Results ofthe Convex Combination Approach
Estimatingthe convex combinationmodel turns outto be computationallyburdensome
and sensitive to the optihtization algorithm chosen. We first estimated the model
assuming all demographic variables to enter only the weighting function (5.19). The
results are presented in Table 5.3.
Several ofthe weighting function parameterestimates are only mildly significant, but
are, apart from the sign (the convention is different) and a factor ofproportionality,
broadly in accordance with the (non-converged) parameters obtainedforthe switching
31regressions (see subsection 5.3.1). Women with higher education or end secondary
education are more likely to take marginal tax rates into account when deciding upon
workforce participation. The same holds for olderwomen. More surprisinglyperhaps,
but still in accordance with the intuition presented in the introduction, the variables
small children and ecole maternelle reveal a significant impact on the probability ofa
rational perception ofthe marginal tax rate. The average estimate ofthe weight given
to full perception (average 'II) is 0.19 with some 15% ofthe individuals giving a weight
above 1/2to completeperceptionofthebudgetconstraint.Thefactthatmostindividuals
in the sample are more likely to ignore their marginal taxes is also reflected in the
estimates ofthe preference parameters which come close to the estimates under the no
tax assumption. Interms ofthe numberofcorrectpredictions this estimatedmodel lies
between those for the participation decision under the two polar cases regarding tax
perception. The squared age variable and the suburb dummy used in Table 5.1 had to
be deleted here due to problems ofconvergence ofthe various optimization routines
applied.
In a second step we estimated a richer specification using the set of demographic
variables belonging to the utility function as well as to the weighting function (see
columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.3). For several choices of the starting values used, con-
vergence was achieved for parameter values ofythat appear at first sight as blown-up
versions of the estimates of the restricted model. Yet there are striking differences
beyondscale. Firstly, none ofthe coefficients ofthe weighting function turns out to be
significant. Secondly, the average estimate of'II is now much smaller. Accordingly,
the preference parameters are more similar in size and significance to those from the
simple participationmodel basedon the gross wage rate (see columns 3 and 4 ofTable
5.1 for comparison).
Finally, we used the estimated parameters of the restricted model to calculate the
perceived wage rate according to equation (5.18) and estimated the borderline models
with the estimated perceived wage rate instead. The number of correct predictions
(0.691%) is close to the figure obtained when taxes are completely ignored (0.697%)
and exceeds the figure for the full tax borderline case by roughly 2%.
32Table 5.3 Estimates ofthe convex combination model
Model restricted pref. unrestr. pref. 2-stage estimation
Variable coeff. t-val. coeff. t-val. coeff. t-val.
preference parameters
intercept 2.5696 14.20 2.7363 11.52 eJ·1853 9.30
(age-40)/1O -0.3176 -9.24 -0.2521 -7.35
same, squared -0.0968 -2.94 -0.0647 -2.04
primary school 0.1829 3.18 0.1810 3.11
lower secondary -0.0594 -0.66 0.1091 1.22
end secondary 0.1163 -0.97 0.1247 1.08
higher education -0.2652 -1.73 0.1703 1.17
small children -0.5460 -8.16 -0.4390 -6.16
ecole maternelle -0.3430 -6.25 -0.3053 -5.59
one other child -0.0837 -1.29 -0.1292 -2.06
two other children -0.3488 -4.54 -0.3752 -4.87
> 2 other children -0.2698 -2.62 -0.3888 -3.81
suburb dummy -0.0043 -0.09 0.0347 0.71
l/marg. wage [1/w] -18.0392 -6.89 -17.9048 -5.92 -13.017 -4.30
owner/w -0.8166 -0.73 -0.0624 -0.05 -0.4611 -0.40
buyer/w 2.8760 3.70 2.8596 3.52 2.6029 3.28
rn/w -4.1054 -18.19 -4.0026 -15.27 -3.2987 -12.13
parameters of'II
intercept -5.4347 -3.38 -1124.5 -0.11
(age-40)/l0 3.3674 4.47 555.2 0.10
primary school -0.8991 -1.15 -83.8 -0.04
lower secondary 0.6877 0.61 27.7 0.02
end secondary 3.7416 4.29 1029.7 0.10
higher education 4.6546 3.74 388.6 0.11
small children 4.9568 2.54 490.6 0.02
ecole maternelle 2.8853 3.22 249.1 0.09
one other child 0.0415 0.04 24.0 0.01
two other children 1.4464 1.39 -104.0 -0.05
> 2 other children 2.6174 2.04 639.0 0.11
-2*Log Lik. 4317 4134 4220
33Table 5.4 Disregard Probabilities and Participation Wage Elasticities
Statistics \ Quantiles 1% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 99% mean
Disregard probabilities
5
all women (a) 0.005 0.276 0.753 0.961 0.996 0.999 0.811
(b) 0 0.939
non-participants (a) 0.002 0.123 0.586 0.916 0.989 0.998 0.747
(b) 0 0.901




all women (1) 0.177 0.565 0.941 1.597 2.551 3.720 7.773 1.975
(2) 0.642 1.498 2.301 3.601 5.295 7.829 15.716 4.308
(3) 0.178 0.582 0.980 1.703 2.838 4.575 10.018 2.271
non-participants (1) 0.369 0.944 1.405 2.140 3.156 4.654 8.728 2.546
(2) 0.909 1.995 2.974 4.379 6.368 9.033 18.266 5.169
(3) 0.426 0.992 1.492 2.385 .3.682 5.934 12.828 3.039
seekers (1) 0.211 0.486 0.822 1.315 2.236 3.181 6.866 1.687
(2) 0.645 1.028 1.928 2.986 4.358 6.031 15.947 3.524
(3) 0.211 0.486 0.829 1.402 2.312 3.499 6.866 1.792
Models ofTable 5.1: non-participants
gross wage rate 0.494 1.114 1.701 2.608 3.852 5.665 10.414 3.086
marginal wage rate 0.033 0.172 0.315 0.536 0.885 1.357 2.790 0.688
5 We refer to the lower panel ofTable 5.3:
(a) column 1,
(b) column 2.
6Wereportelasticitiescomputed with theparameterestimatesofthesecondcolumn in thefirstpanel
ofTable 5.3:
(1) Gross wage and virtual dissaving,
(2) Net wage and virtual dissaving,
(3) "Expected" elasticity.
345.3.3 Estimated Disregard Probabilities and Participation Elasticities
" Table 5.4 gives quantiles and means for the magnitudes ofinterest, first for all women
in the sample (3658 observations), then for the true non-participants (1902 observa-
tions), and finally for those who do not work but report that they are looking for a job
(200 observations). True non-participants have higher disregard probability than
seekers,but aloweronethan the participants, which is in accordance withthe intuition.
Looking into some more detail than reported in the table we foundthat a large number
ofchildrenandahigheducationwere associatedwiththelowestdisregardprobabilities.
All participation elasticities reported are very high, except those ofthe last line ofthe
table, which correspond to the parameters ofthe first column ofTable 5.1 and thus to
disregard probabilities of zero for everyone. Although this is not supported by the
evidence presented here, this is still the model we would prefer to use for policy
simulations ... until we have a better one.
6 Conclusions
This paper addresses the issue whether married women perceive their true marginal
tax rate when making their labour supply decision and to what extend the perception
differs among various socio-economic groups. A simple framework of analysis is
presented and three alternative suitable statistical models discussed.
While the computational burden ofthe first approach is comparable to the computa-
tional burden involved with the estimationofmoreconventional laboursupplymodels
the two latter approaches seem to require larger sample sizes than the one considered
in the empirical'part ofthis study. Due to the computational problems involved in the
estimationofthetwo latterapproaches,the differentdefinitionofthedependentvariable
and a slightly different set ofexplanatory variables, a final conclusion on the basis of
the comparison ofthe functional forms is premature. Therefore, the results for these
two approaches have mainly illustrative character.
All three approaches deviate from standard neoclassical labour supply approaches by
functional form, Le. the deviation from rational acting behaviour is only identified by
assumingaspecificform fortheunderlyinglaboursupplyfunctions. Hencetheeventual
35statistical significance ofthe parameters that reflect this departure might be the result
of a misspecification of the labour supply function rather than evidence against
rationality. This made a comparison of various functional forms and a comparison
across countries particularly meaningful. Since the estimates ofmodels with different
underlying preference structure point into the same direction with respect to the per-
ception parameters, this is some evidence that the additional parameters, do pick up
what they are intended to.
All estimates have one thing in common regardless ofwhich model is appliedorwhich
data set is used: the estimates are more in accordance with the extreme disregard
assumption. Contraryto the findings byRosen(1976 b) who does not find asignificant
departurefrom acorrectperceptionofmarginaltaxes, noneofthe approachespresented
here gives support to the neoclassical view ofcomplete rationality.
Ingeneral the models lead to the same conclusions: 1The probability ofdisregard of
the marginal tax rate by married women is a decreasing function ofage, ofeducation,
and of the number of children they have. 2 Previous estimates obtained under the
assumption of complete disregard of the marginal tax rate for everyone suggested a
negative impact ofeducation on participation. This counterintuitive result disappears
when the impact ofeducation on the perception ofthe marginal tax rate is taken into
account.
This encouraging aspect ofthe results should not mask their fragility. In particular it
wo~ld be important to develop a theoretical model that jointlyexplains labour supply
and learning behaviour about taxes. Our approach of modelling the individuals tax
perception is fairly traditional in the sense that perception is explained by standard
variables used in labour supply specifications. Anotherpath offuture research should
incorporate insights from economic psychology. Iftax perception is regarded as the
mediation between tax stimulus and labour supply response to the tax stimulus one
should incorporate'soft' variables such as the beliefs about the disincentive effects of
taxation or perceptions of the purpose of taxation and preferences about the redis-
tribution ofwealth (see for instance Lewis, 1982).
36Finally, in order to assess the overall impact of taxes on labour supply a closer look
should be taken at the qualitative dimensions of labour supply (motivation, job satis-
faction etc...) rather than at the participation hours decision alone.
Appendix: Simulation Results
for the Switching Regressions Model
Table AI shows the bias in the estimates of the preference parameter b and of the
switching parameter c for various values ofthe correlation p when the presence ofthe
latter is ignored. The corresponding pseudo-true values are obtained by minimization
ofthe Kullback-Leibler information critelion. The conditional expectation ofy given
theexogenousvariablesandtheparametersisthecorrespondingconditionalprobability
of[y =1] andtheexpectationwithrespecttothe distributionoftheexogenousvariables
is estimated by the sample mean over a simulated sample. In the 1000 simulated
independent observations,Xl is the constant 1, X2is standard normal, andZ is uniform
in [-0.5,0.5] and independent ofX2•
Table A1 Pseudo-true values for b and c when p is ignored.
b
c















It appears that the bias in both coefficients is quite small up to p=0.5 and remains
fairly small beyond that for b, but becomes important for c.
Table A2 shows estimation results forindependent samples with different sizes, using
the same design (but not the same realization) as above for the exogenous variables
and with (u, v) bivariate normal with variances 1 and correlation p =0.28. The true
values ofb and c are as above and this yields odds ofabout (2/3, 1/3) for y.
37Table A2 (Estimated) Precision with Different Sample Sizes.
Sample size 500 1000 5000
p=o P p=o P p=o p
estimated estimated estimated
b 0.781 0.775 1.036 1.044 1.001 1.007
(0.105) (0.104) (0.083) (0.085) (0.036) (0.037)
c 0.887 0.690 1.631 1.615 0.970 0.955
(0.520) (0.447) (0.359) (0.354) (0.143) (0.142)
P 0.700 0.190 0.217
(0.263) (0.126) (0.123)
roc -0.125 0.014 -0.325 -0.324 -0.176 -0.174
r bp -0.282 0.026 0.017
rep -0.351 -0.046 -0.095
mean log-Uk. -0.6194 -0.6164 -0.5639 -0.5636 -0.5799 -0.5796
Theseresultsindicatethatbisestimatedmorepreciselythanc whichisintumestimated
more precisely than p. A sample size of 1000 seems necessary in this example to
estimate b satisfactorily, whereas 5000 is barely enough for c and clearly insufficient
for p. Forthe large sample size, the estimations with and without the restriction p =0
yield very similar results, and it seems to be the case that the restricted estimator
converges more quickly to the pseudo-true values than the restricted estimator to the
true values. All this should be confinued by a Monte-Carlo study, but at this stage it
suffices to motivate our choice ofthe restricted estimator.
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